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Abstract
On Wikipedia, the largest online encyclopedia, editors who contribute to the same arti-
cles and exchange comments on articles’ talk pages work in collaborative manner engaging
in communication about their work. Thus they can be considered as peers who are likely to
influence each other. In this article, I examine whether the activity of these peers, measured
by the average amount of peer contributions or by the number of peers, yields spillovers to
the amount of contributions by individuals. The partially overlapping group structure allows
to identify peer e↵ects and to use the number of the indirect peers as an instrument for the
activity and the number of direct peers. The results show that, while controlling for observ-
able editor and peer characteristics, an increase in the monthly average peer contribution by
1 per cent increases the amount of individual monthly contributions to Wikipedia (among
individuals that contribute to Wikipedia every month) by up to 0.4 per cent. Similarly,
spillovers coming from the number of peers yield a positive e↵ect of 0.17 per cent per article
to 0.05 per cent for overall monthly contributions to Wikipedia.
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and indirect peers.
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1 Introduction
The emergence of participatory web applications based on digital technology transformed
the users of online information into the active producers of knowledge (Lerner and Tirole
(2002)). As a result, a significant amount of knowledge and open-source software generated
on online platforms is produced by the participants of online communities. Prominent ex-
amples of such peer production communities are technical support forums (stackoverflow,
quora), open source software, e.g. the operating system Linux,1 or the online encyclopedia
Wikipedia 2. The volunteer activity of individuals with heterogenous backgrounds results in
a socially valuable output. Since Wikipedia appeared it demonstrated a new way to organize
knowledge generation processes. The idea of such a platform was adopted by some firms
with the aim to to organize internal knowledge accumulation, although this proved to be
challenging.
The voluntary provision of public goods on the Internet crucially depends on how ef-
fectively the large-scale human interaction systems will be designed in order to motivate
voluntary participation. Benkler (2002) compares peer production with traditional produc-
tion by firms in the markets and suggests gains from peer production in terms of information
collection cost and improved allocation due to availability of large sets of resources, agents
and projects. Recent economic research advanced in understanding the role of social moti-
vation for contributions to Wikipedia (Algan et al. (2013), Zhang and Zhu (2010)). Zhang
and Zhu (2010) find that the size of the recipient audience matters for the amount of knowl-
edge contributed to Wikipedia. Algan et al. (2013) focus on the impact of social image and
reciprocity for the size of charity donations to Wikipedia. My paper goes further in under-
standing how social mechanisms work on Wikipedia by analyzing whether the performance
of peers has an e↵ect on individual knowledge contributions. The empirical analysis is based
1Linux runs on more than 100K machines and 71M Linux users (LinuxCounter web-site)
2Wikipedia has over 1.8M users and 31.2M articles (Stats.wikimedia site). All data on the use of open
source platforms are as in May 2014
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on a sample that tracks contributions of more than 520 editors3 on 330 pages in selected
article categories during the period from January 2005 to December 2010. The full revision
history allows to identify the set of peers for each editor, which varies across articles. I
construct the network of peers that are considered to be connected with each other if they
contributed to the same article and commented on the talk page of the article. Using the
panel structure of the data (editors’ monthly contributions) and the structure of the editor
network I analyze whether there are spillovers to content generation by an individual from
the amount of content generated by her peers or from the number of peers.
For identification of peer e↵ects I apply an econometric technique based on De Giorgi
et al. (2010), which allows disentangling peer e↵ects from exogenous characteristics of peers
and correlated e↵ects within groups. By groups, in which peers interact, I mean articles
on Wikipedia written by editors in collaborative manner. Using information on collabora-
tive writing of articles I construct the editor network, in which peer groups have partially
overlapping structure. The econometric approach applied here takes advantage of this net-
work feature. The property of partially overlapping groups enables variation of the group
mean across individuals and thereby generates enough observations for the identification of
the coe cient on peer e↵ects. Moreover, the set of instruments based on the number of
peers of peers (in what follows I label them as indirect peers or the excluded peers) becomes
available. The number of indirect peers is correlated with the direct peer performance but
uncorrelated with shocks to the peer group of the focal individual and with her performance.
To address the endogenous network formation problem, I provide a set of robustness checks
for the potential drivers of larger contributions such as external shocks to the content or
self-selection into the network.
The results show that, while controlling for observable editor and peer characteristics,
an increase in the monthly average peer contribution by 1 per cent increases the amount
of individual monthly contributions to Wikipedia (among individuals that contribute to
3Hereafter, I will use the term ”editors” or ”contributors” for users who contribute voluntarily by editing
articles on Wikipedia.
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Wikipedia every month) by about 0.44 per cent. An increase in peer contributions by 1
per cent would amount to 130 bytes and it would correspond to a 0.44 per cent increase in
individual contributions, or 8.8 bytes. Assuming that 1000 bytes are approximately a page
of A4 size, an increase in peer contributions by one text page would lead to an increase in
individual contributions by 1/10th of the page. Similarly, spillovers coming from the number
of peers yield a positive e↵ect of 0.17 per cent per article and 0.05 per cent per overall monthly
contributions to Wikipedia. This evidence suggests that even in the absence of explicit
”online-friendship” ties between individuals (similar to those established on Facebook and
other platforms) peer e↵ects are present. These e↵ects are both observed among individuals
that contribute at least monthly to Wikipedia and also have peers during this interval,
meaning that they contribute to the articles and engage into discussions on the article talk
pages on a monthly basis. These results suggest that communications between most active
community members encourages building-up and promoting new online communities and
enhances knowledge generation in the existing on-line communities. In addition, the amount
of individual contributions is a↵ected by an interest, or an expertise, in a special category of
articles, which suggests the presence of the interest-based motivation for individual online
contributions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the relevant literature.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the econometric model. The main results
are discussed in Section 5, and the robustness check are presented in Section 6. Section 7
concludes.
2 Background and hypotheses
2.1 Preferences in contributions
Peer productive knowledge platforms can be distinguished in several important aspects.
The specific feature of Wikipedia is the way content is generated. The content in Wikipedia
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can be very sensitive to the events happening outside it and, therefore, important instruments
for enhancing attention spillover are exogenous shocks to the content (Kummer (2013)). The
newly created empty articles can be considered as signals to experienced contributors that
there is a demand on that type of content (Gorbatai (2011)).
The organizational structure of content generation, potential rewards, and the usage of
output in Wikipedia also di↵er significantly from open source software. While the output of
open-source projects is often aimed at sophisticated users, an online encyclopedia has a high
value for the vast range of users, therefore, representing a public good. Due to the modular
structure, little communication between developers of open-source software is needed. On the
contrary, for encyclopedic content is sometimes a subject of discussion between contributors
with several contradicting opinions. Since any revision can be reverted, contributors have
to agree on the content (explicitly or implicitly) in order that the content remains on the
page for a longer time. In contrast to open-source projects where monetary incentives are
implicitly present through the future expectations of project participants for better-paid
jobs, in Wikipedia social and psychological incentives (reciprocity, socialization) can instead
play a very important role (Osterloh and Rota (2007), Algan et al. (2013)).
Contrary to social networks, Wikipedia does not have explicit friendship ties. Individuals
become peers in the process of collaborative content generation. Do social e↵ects, neverthe-
less, matter onWikipedia provided such a structure? Studies focusing onWikipedia point out
that when the group of individuals is su ciently large, private benefits dominate free-riding
incentives, thus enabling the provision of a public good (Zhang and Zhu (2010)). Voluntary
contributions might bread recognition in the community or improve social image of an indi-
vidual (Lacetera and Macis (2010), Algan et al. (2013)) or contributions might be a↵ected
by the feeling of reciprocity. Algan et al. (2013) find that reciprocity matters for donations
to Wikipedia, while Shriver et al. (2013) and Harper et al. (2010) find this phenomenon
in other social networks, correspondingly, for wind-surfing and movielens. However, to the
best of my knowledge there is still no analysis of an impact peers might have on individuals
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regarding the amount of contributions. Peer e↵ects arise when individuals interact in groups
and the average outcomes of peers a↵ect individual outcomes. The present study fills this
gap in the literature by showing that the interactions with other editors indeed matter for
the core of the most productive contributors.4
Theoretical and empirical studies provide confronting views on the mechanisms that
underlay the success or the failure of productive online communities. On the one hand,
individuals contributing to online communities might have incentives to free-ride, meaning
that as a group expands, individual contributions would decline (Andreoni (1988), Bilodeau
and Slivinski (1996)). In these models a contributor receives utility from the total provision
and her private consumption of a public good. With an increase in the group size an average
contribution level falls to zero and only individuals with the lowest costs of contributing or the
highest income will contribute. In Andreoni (2007) an individual’s utility depends also on the
number of recipients of the public good. When the recipient group size is su ciently large,
the relative importance of private benefits, as compared to free-riding incentives, dominates
and positively a↵ects individual contributions.
In the case studies of successful open source software projects, Lerner and Tirole (2002)
stress the importance of a new organizational structure, which requires low capital invest-
ments to the projects and relies on the collaboration between individuals. In the project
Apache the organizational structure that enables success of the project is represented by the
core of responsible editors and a large number of volunteer participants.
The empirical literature on Wikipedia suggests individual interests and/or expertise as
one of the main reasons for contributions. Panciera et al. (2009) show that only a small
fraction of editors, so-called ”Wikipedians”, contribute more intensely than others from
the moment of their initiation, and all contributors reduce activity over time, with only
4In the recent economic literature the influence of peers on individual behaviour has been already ad-
dressed in a number of contexts, for instance, in individual decisions on housing area (Hanushek et al. (2003)),
schooling or degree (De Giorgi et al. (2010)), health attributes such as obesity or smoking (Fowler and Chris-
takis (2008)). The definition of peers also di↵ers depending on the context. Peers could be individuals that
interact in groups while studying (school mates or students), live in the neighborhood or produce together
some output (co-authors, colleagues, open-source software developers).
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distinction that ”Wikipedians” end up at higher levels of contribution. Nov (2007) surveys
Wikipedia contributors and finds that the top motivations were ”Fun” and ”Ideology”
(individuals support open-source). Laniado and Tasso (2011) find the presence of a nucleus
of very active contributors that spread their contributions over the whole Wikipedia, and
interact with inexperienced users. In this case, individual preferences would a↵ect the
amount of contributions to Wikipedia. Together, these findings provide a strong support to
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. An interest in a specific topic, or an expertise in it, positively a↵ects
individual contributions to Wikipedia.
Contributions can also be induced by the characteristics of Wikipedia articles. For in-
stance, Keegan et al. (2012) suggest that pages that appear due to some exogenous shock
(”breaking news”) initially experience di↵erent patterns of contribution with highly clus-
tered and centralized editors’ interactions. In their approach, tighter collaborations are
rather caused by shocks to pages. To avoid capturing the impact of exogenous shocks to
pages, I run robustness checks excluding pages that have breaking news properties as well as
pages that experience extremely high attention, measured in clicks on the pages. Aaltonen
and Seiler (2014) suggest that page size, which is a measure for accumulated editor activity,
triggers further contributions due to knowledge spillovers. Controlling for the page size allows
to capture this potential source of spillover. Overall, the above mentioned studies suggest
an impact of exogenous editor and page characteristics on contributions to Wikipedia.
2.2 Existence and nature of peer e↵ects
There is a range of studies that examine the existence of potential peer e↵ects in social
networks and Q&A forums. Bapna and Umyarov (2012) show that on Spotify an exogenous
adoption of a premium subscription by peers increases individual adoption by 50%. Notably,
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this e↵ect is stronger for users with fewer friends. Hahn et al. (2008) study collaboration
ties in open-source software development projects and show that prior collaboration ties and
the perceived status of project members in the network matter for developers’ choice to join
new projects. Shriver et al. (2013) use the variation in wind speeds at surfing locations
in Switzerland as an exogenous shifter of content generation about surfing activity onto an
online social network. The local network e↵ect in content generation is suggested to cause an
increase in content and, as a result, stronger ties between users, which, in turn, breads more
visits and browsing on the web site. Moon and Sproull (2008) highlight the role of feedback
in producing and sustaining high-quality contributions: in groups where systematic quality
feedback systems are implemented (e.g. rating system) question askers return over a longer
duration, answer providers contribute more often.
Several empirical studies on Wikipedia reexamine the existence of social e↵ects for the
case of an online encyclopedia where neither explicit friendship ties nor organizational struc-
ture are present. In Wikipedia, the size of the potential recipient audience matters. When
the group of individuals is su ciently large, private benefits from contributing to a public
good dominate free-riding incentives (Zhang and Zhu (2010)). Another reason is that volun-
tary contributions bread recognition in the community or improve social image of individuals
(Lacetera and Macis (2010), Algan et al. (2013)). Together with the social image, the feeling
of reciprocity to peers (expectation that they will also contribute if she does) positively a↵ect
individual money donations to Wikipedia (Algan et al. (2013)). These reasons are also sup-
ported by psychological literature (Burke et al. (2010); Kittur and Kraut (2010); Faulkner
et al. (2012)), documenting that in Wikipedia, numerous direct communications occur on
user-talk pages and talk pages of articles. These studies describe socialization strategies of
individuals in online communities, including requests of participation or information and
expressions of similarity to others. Their findings suggest that personalized moderation is
e↵ective in order to increase the number of contributing members and their commitment,
while community-level moderation increases only commitment.
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There are several studies that are closest to the present study in that they analyze the
mechanism underlaying collaborations on Wikipedia. Gorbatai and Piskorski (2012) suggest
that editors involved in high-density structures in the network of editors are less likely to
abandon contributing.5 Gorbatai (2011) proposes to consider collective contributions to an
online public good in the absence of price mechanisms as the following three-stage process.
First, consumers express the demand for the public good by occasional contributions. Then,
at the third stage, producers observe the unsatisfied demand for knowledge and become
willing to improve these collective goods. In addition to the demand-supply model, social
e↵ects in Wikipedia have been addressed in the two articles, Algan et al. (2013) and Zhang
and Zhu (2010) mentioned above. However, until now, not much is known about peer e↵ects
in Wikipedia and their role in motivating individual contributions.
In the present paper, I examine another potential factor of social influence on con-
tributions, i.e. the e↵ect of peer performance on individual performance. In sociological
literature, Sassenberg (2002) suggests that individuals may feel psychologically connected
to a group and hence act according to the norms and the standard behaviour of the group.
Moreover, social learning theory argues that individuals follow the behavior of relevant
peers if they face uncertainty about norms as this strategy maximizes their expected payo↵s
given the chosen strategy (Bercovitz and Feldman (2008)). There is also a number of
education studies (De Giorgi et al. (2010), Contreras et al. (2012)) that suggest the presence
of peer e↵ects on the individual performance. In line with previous studies I expect that
individuals involved into contributing to Wikipedia observe their peers’ activity and, in
response, change their activity. As a result, peer activity is suggested to positively a↵ect
individual contributions in Wikipedia.
Hypothesis 2-1. The amount of individuals’ contributions is possibly a↵ected by the
5The two editors are connected in the networks if they contributed to the same article within 1 week.
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average amount of peer activity.
Hypothesis 2-2. The amount of individuals’ contributions is possibly a↵ected by the
number of peers.
This paper adopts the econometric framework for peer e↵ect analysis, which was devel-
oped in the empirical studies of academic performance (Contreras et al. (2012)), researcher
collaboration with industry (Kacperczyk (2013), Aschho↵ and Grimpe (2014)) career choices
(De Giorgi et al. (2010)), and health-related attributes, such as obesity, smoking (Fowler
and Christakis (2008)). This methodology is based on partially overlapping groups of peers
(De Giorgi et al. (2010); Contreras et al. (2012)). De Giorgi et al. (2010) present an em-
pirical analysis of students’ choices of major (Economics or Business) as a↵ected by their
peers’ choices after controlling for individual characteristics of students (age, gender, school-
ing grade). The characteristics of excluded peers (for an individual, the set of peers that
are in the same groups with her direct peers but unconnected directly with her) are used as
instruments. A two-stage least squares estimator is used to find the peer e↵ect (the choices
of peers) on the outcome (students’ own choices of major between Economics and Business).
Contreras et al. (2012) study the peer influence on students’ grades in the public University
College of Business at US. In order to estimate the endogenous peer e↵ect they use the ex-
clusion restriction approach (similar to De Giorgi et al. (2010)). They find that a student’s
classroom performance has a significant demotivating e↵ect on her peers. Furthermore, they
classify excluded peers by ability on 4 groups according to percentiles and examine their e↵ect
on low- and high-ability students’ performance. The low ability excluded students are shown
to have a negative e↵ect on other students. At the same time, high ability excluded students
have a negative e↵ect on low ability students, while high ability excluded students have a
positive e↵ect on high ability students. Hanushek et al. (2003) also investigate peer e↵ects
on student achievements. In order to separate peer e↵ects from other confounding influences
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and to address the reciprocal nature of peer interactions, they apply past achievement as a
measure of peer group quality.
In the case of Wikipedia, I use a definition of peers according to which editors are getting
connected by contributing to Wikipedia articles together within a short time period. The
composition of peer groups of an individual varies across pages. This gives rise to partially
overlapping peer groups, which are the key to solve the “reflection problem” (Manski (1993)).
The excluded peers of an editor are those editors that do not collaborate with her directly
but work together with her direct peers on other articles.
3 Data
The dataset is obtained from a publicly available dump of the GermanWikipedia provided
by Wikimedia Deutschland. It is currently the second largest Wikipedia and accounts for
about 1500,000 articles. The dump contains meta-information on articles’ revisions including
the time stamps and the contributors’ identifiers. The empirical analysis is based on the
sample, which tracks contributions of more than 520 editors on 330 pages in some selected
categories of Wikipedia articles during the period from January, 2005 to December, 2010. To
reduce the size of the data set, I use the meta revision history only for articles in the following
categories: Alcohol, Astrology, China, Druids, Economics, India, Islands, Medicine, Soccer,
Reptiles.6 The data identify contributors, which edited articles at given moments in time.
They enable constructing an editor network where editors are connected due to contributions
to the same articles and comments on the articles’ talk pages.
Some contributions in Wikipedia are made anonymously and so they are identified in
Wikipedia by the IP addresses of the contributors. Since the contributions of the same editor
in Wikipedia revision history might have di↵erent IP addresses, they provide a misleading
information on the activity of contributors and are excluded from the data sample. Bots, e.g.
6The meta data dump does not contain the information about article categories. The tree of article
categories should be additionally extracted. All categories available in our database are used in this study.
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automated scripts, can be identified from the data and are also excluded from the editors’
network. Therefore, the final sample contains only registered users. Furthermore, in order
to avoid taking into account vandalism and consequent reverts of the pages I exclude from
editor activity revisions, for which the revision length varies from some positive value to 0
and back to positive value within the consequential periods. The analysis of contributor and
peer activity is performed only for the articles in the main Wikipedia name space.
3.1 Dependent variables
In order to measure the activity of individual contributors on Wikipedia this study con-
siders the logarithms of the total number of bytes changed, which is the sum of the absolute
values of bytes added and deleted. All measures of individual activity are computed as the
activity of individual i on page j in time t for the analysis at the editor-article level, and
then aggregated for individual i at time t in the analysis at the editor level.
3.2 Independent variables
3.2.1 Peer e↵ects
Peer e↵ects can arise from interaction with peers. Individuals are likely to observe their
peers’ activity as measured by the total peer contributions. Consequently, peer e↵ects can
be captured by the average amounts of peer contributions measured in bytes or by the
number of peers. The definition of peers rests on the collaboration mechanisms provided in
Wikipedia. Beyond contributing to the same article, editors can leave messages on the talk
page of each article. Therefore, my measure of peers relies on co-authorship of an article in
Wikipedia and coordination involving talk pages of each article. More precisely, two editors
are connected on the article if they have collaborated on it within a monthly time span (four
weeks) and left comments on the talk page of the article. In order to bring the definition of
links between editors closer to the notions of collaborative content generation, I consider two
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editors as peers only if they made at least 2 revisions of an article and one revision of the
article’s talk page each during a month. Once the link is set up, it expires in 4 weeks unless
both editors contribute to the article again in the next period. Then, monthly snapshots of
the editor network are taken to construct the final data set. This definition of peers is similar
to the definition in the study of academic entrepreneurship (Aschho↵ and Grimpe (2014)),
where co-authors of academic papers are regarded as peers. This definition also considers
tighter collaborations between individuals than Gorbatai and Piskorski (2012). The average
amount of peer contributions is a weighted average, where the weights are defined by the
intensity of communication, i.e. the product of the number of revisions made by the two
connected editors.
The definition of the editor network in Wikipedia ignores occasional contributors, which
make revisions once and never come back (less than 2% of the initial sample of contributors),
such that only contributors with more than 5 revisions during the years 2007 - 2011 are in the
sample. Registered bots (the editor accounts which are registered on Wikipedia as automated
programs) as well as editors with suspiciously high number of monthly edits7 (which could
be unregistered bots) are excluded from the sample to avoid blowing up the human activity
on Wikipedia.
3.2.2 Editor characteristics
The independent variables are characteristics of editors and articles that can be extracted
from the revision history dump of German Wikipedia.
The editor characteristics are the most important control variables. From the data, I
can compute the editor experience measured as the length of the period in months since
the individual’s first contribution to Wikipedia. It captures the impact of the editor’s life
cycle on Wikipedia. Further, I can infer to which article category (from available Eco-
nomics, Medicine, Soccer, Alcohol, Astronomy, China, Druids, India, Reptiles) an individual
7We assume that a human being cannot contribute to German Wikipedia more than 9000 edits within
four weeks (less than 1% of the initial sample of contributors).
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contributed mostly and what is the share of his contributions to this category in his total
contributions to Wikipedia. The share of contributions to the most interesting category
indicates how specialized is the interest of an individual in one specific topic, which could
explain the size of the contribution to Wikipedia.
Editors connected in the network might share interests, for example, they might be both
interested to read and contribute to articles about famous economists. Then, in order to
account for the similar interest or expertise, which are due to homophyly of interests rather
than by the activity of peers we compute the share of common preferences with a peer as
the share of the editor’s articles, to which he contributed together with the peer. Controlling
for the amount of shared pages allows to disentangle the e↵ect of peer activity in terms of
contribution size from the e↵ect of a productive cluster of individuals that edit several pages
together.
Additionally, I control for the potential preference of the editor to contribute only to very
popular articles. To account for the behavior according to which an editor usually browses
popular articles and sometimes introduces minor changes, I compute the share of popular
articles in the articles to which the editor contributed. Five per cent of articles that got
the highest accumulated number of clicks in the category are considered to be popular. The
share of these articles in the total number of the editor’s articles accounts for the preference
for popular topics rather than a specific interest or expertise in the topic. Individuals who
often browse Wikipedia’s most popular pages 8 might contribute small pieces of knowledge
or correct typos. Then, such a behaviour could be a potential reason for contributions to
Wikipedia.
3.2.3 Article characteristics
An important characteristic that could be extracted from the data dump in the absence
of the full-text revision history is the average page size in kilobytes during each month.
8For instance, the starting page of Wikipedia every day advertises a new article of the day
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Aaltonen and Seiler (2014) suggest that a page needs to grow to a certain size in order to
attract intensive editing activity. According to this finding, I would expect individuals to
contribute more to longer articles. Conversely, the size of the article can thwart adding the
further information once an article is rather complete. Then, I would expect a negative e↵ect
of the article length on individual contributions to this article.
Furthermore, the number of clicks per page indicates if the article got suddenly more
attention and, potentially, more edits due to some exogenous news (e.g. the death of a
famous person). Therefore, following the description of individual behaviour on pages that
are breaking news in Keegan et al. (2012)9 I exclude all activity on breaking news pages
or articles receiving a very high attention (i.e. the large number clicks above the 95the
percentile) from the sample.
Table ?? displays summary statistics on the editor contribution size, editor and article
characteristics for the data used for the analysis at the editor-article level. The logarithms
of individual as well as peer contributions have distributions similar to normal distributions.
9As in Keegan et al. (2012), I define breaking news pages as recently created articles that attract a higher
attention (number of clicks) during the first month since their creation.
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4 Empirical analysis
4.1 The network of peers
Wikipedia articles have talk pages, which provide the contributors with a mechanism
for coordinating their e↵orts. When a disagreement on an article’s content or layout arises,
editors can have a discussion on this article’s talk page. Therefore, my definition of peers is
based on the co-authorship of Wikipedia articles involving communication on the talk pages.
Precisely, individuals are considered to be connected in the network of editors on Wikipedia if
they contributed with a given intensity to the same article and commented to the talk page of
the same article within a short time span. This definition is meant to capture the network of
contributors to Wikipedia that work collaboratively on new content generation and interact
with each other. In order to bring the definition of links closer to the notions of collaborative
content generation, two editors are considered peers only if they make at least 2 revisions of
an article and at least 1 revision on an article talk page each during this time period. The
time span taken in this paper is equal to four weeks. Once the link is set up, it expires in
four weeks unless both editors contribute to the article in the next period as well.
The network of editors obtained under such a definition is depicted in the two consequent
periods in figures 1a and 1b. The nodes represent the contributors and the edges are the pages
they edited together. The nodes are coloured according to their degrees with darker nodes
standing for larger numbers of collaborators per contributor. The edges between contributors
are coloured according to the intensity of collaboration measured by the number of pages
they jointly edited. The figures show that there is no evidence of stable productive clusters
where the most productive editors every period collaborate with selected counterparts.
The network of editors considered in this study is defined similarly to Jackson and Wolin-
sky (1996), where the finite set of players N = 1, 2, .., n are connected in the network and
are represented by the nodes. Their pairwise relations are represented by the arcs of the
network. Network G can be expressed by an NxN adjacent matrix, and gi,j is a link between
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(a) Month t (b) Month t+ 1
Figure 1: The network of editors in Wikipedia from the used sample displayed in two con-
secutive periods
nodes i and j. It takes the value 1 if nodes i and j are connected, and 0 otherwise.10 In
what follows, the set of links of a node i will be denoted by Gi. The equilibrium in such
a network is based on the concept of pairwise stability proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) meaning that the link is formed if both parties involved are consent, while for the
link severance unilateral decision is needed.11
The e↵ect of peer contributions on the performance of focal editors could be analyzed
on two levels. First, I analyze article-specific peer e↵ects, i.e. the productive pressure
experienced by an individual from her peers on a particular article. This peer e↵ect would
indicate how an individual activity on this article would change if she met there more active
peers. This average ”activeness” of the individual’s peers on an article, according to the
linear-in-means model (Manski (1993)) described below, would be expressed by the average
peer contribution across articles other than the focal article. The structure of the peer
network on Wikipedia is displayed in Figure 2. Editors are denoted by numbers within the
10Note that gi,i = 0 and gi,j = gj,i by definition.
11See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bloch and Jackson (2006) for more details on equilibrium stability
and e ciency.
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Figure 2: The network of editors connected due to collaborations on Wikipedia articles:
article-specific peer e↵ects
circles while articles are denoted by letters within the squares. Each editor, say, editor 1,
has a set of direct peers with whom she is connected due to collaboration on article A. This
set of peers varies across articles for each individual. If there was a peer e↵ect, the activity
of 1’s peers on article A would be a↵ected by the average activity of editor 2 on article B
due to interactions on the same article A.
The peer pressure mechanism might function in a di↵erent way. A contributor might
observe his most important peers on the set of articles she contributes to. The interaction
with more engaged peers might a↵ect this contributor in a way such that she feels also
more engaged to Wikipedia and checks more articles in order to add some more content.
As opposed to the first mechanism, once the article where the editor is currently working
is filled with information, she might find it reasonable to switch e↵ort to other articles.
Therefore, beside an analysis of article-specific peer e↵ects, the potential peer e↵ect should
be also analyzed as the impact of average peer total contributions on individual total monthly
contributions to Wikipedia. Figure 3 displays the corresponding data structure. Here, I
consider editors connected due to collaborations on some sets of articles. The overall peer
e↵ect then would be expressed as how an individual activity of editor 1 on all articles, which
in our example consists of contributions only to article A, would be a↵ected by the average
contributions of editor 2 to all her articles except article A, in this example contributions to
article B.
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Figure 3: The network of editors connected due to collaborations on Wikipedia articles:
overall peer e↵ects
4.2 Econometric methodology
To address the research question whether peers’ productivity a↵ects contributors’ out-
comes in Wikpedia I adopt the linear-in-means model introduced by Manski (1993):
yijt = ↵ij +  E(y|Git) +Xit  + E(X|Git)  + Zjt✓ + ✏ijt (1)
where a contribution of editor i on article j at time t is a↵ected by the average amount of
peer contributions (E(y|Git)) as well as by the vector of her peers’ exogenous characteristics
(E(X|Git)), and Git denotes the peer group of an individual i at time t. This can be rewritten
as:
yijt = ↵ij +  
P
k2P ijt yk jt
NP ijt
+Xit  +
P
k2P ijt Xkt
NP ijt
  + Zjt✓ + ✏ijt (2)
where yijt is the logarithm of the contribution length (in bytes) by editor i on article j at
time t andXit is the vector of characteristics of editor i.  
P
k2P ijt yk
NP ijt
is an endogenous e↵ect of
peers’ productivity (measured as a logarithm of the average amount of peers’ contributions),
where k 2 P ijt is a member of individual i’s peer group composed of NP ijt members.P
j2Pit Xjt
NPit
is an exogenous or contextual e↵ect of peers characteristics and preferences on the
individual outcomes, aimed at capturing a homophyly, i.e. the property capturing that the
connected individuals can be similar in some observed characteristics such as, for instance,
interests or experience. Finally, Zjt is the vector of observable article characteristics (or, in
the terminology of education studies, group characteristics).
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If the coe cient   is positive, equation 2 shows the extent, to which an individual editor
is willing to contribute more to an article if her peers also contribute more on average. In
Wikipedia, it is technically possible to check who are the peers in the revision history of an
article, and then one can go further by clicking on any peer in order to check how active
she has been. The latter e↵ect is captured by equation 2. However, the former action is less
technically sophisticated than the latter. In some specifications of the model I also check
this former mechanism. Concretely, I examine whether spillovers due to a higher number of
peers a↵ect individual performance. Then, the model estimated is:
yijt = ↵ij +  NP ijt +X
0
it  +
P
k2P ijt Xkt
NP ijt
  + Z 0jt✓ + ✏ijt (3)
Peer pressure might also be important for the overall level of the engagement in knowl-
edge generation on the Wikipedia platform. Once the article where the editor is currently
working is filled with information, she might find it reasonable to switch e↵ort to other ar-
ticles. Therefore, beside an analysis at the editor-article level, the potential peer impact on
individual contributions is also analyzed at the level of overall individual contributions per
time period aggregated across articles. Then, the empirical model is given by:
yit = ↵i +  
P
k2P it yk jt
NP it
+X 0it  +
P
k2P it Xkt
NP it
  + ✏it (4)
The positive peer e↵ect in this model would indicate that there are positive spillovers due
to collaboration with other contributors that a↵ect an individual motivation to provide more
knowledge to overall Wikipedia. Similarly to the editor-article level, at the editor level peer
e↵ects can also be expressed through the number of peers on Wikipedia across all articles,
analogically to equation 3.
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4.3 Identification issues and instrumental variables
In the linear-in-means model, the ”reflection problem” and correlated e↵ects are usually
considered the major threats to identification of peer e↵ects (Manski (1993)). Since in
Wikipedia, the network structure is based on partially overlapping peer groups, this solves
the reflection problem allowing to identify peer e↵ects. Then, correlated e↵ects (the shocks
that are common to groups, in the context of Wikipedia to articles) could be addressed by
using exogenous characteristics of indirect peers as instruments for endogenous outcomes of
direct peers (as discussed in Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), De Giorgi et al. (2010)). In the case
of Wikipedia, these could be shocks of attention to article content. To eliminate the impact
of these shocks, I use the number of indirect peers (in some specifications, its second order
polynomial) as an instrument for the peer e↵ects coming from direct peers.
The most important concern in the analysis of peer e↵ects is the potential endogeneity
of the network formation. This problem arises since individuals choose endogenously coun-
terparts with whom they become peers. In Wikipedia, individuals come to read articles and
their decision to contribute is most likely related to the content of an article rather than
because of other editors’ characteristics. Individuals can hardly observe other contributors’
individual characteristics because few contributors have an extensive user profile. What
they observe most are contributions of each other. In this case, after observing contribu-
tions of others one might choose to remain peers with them. However, learning about ”key”
productive users takes time. So, I make a robustness check examining the peer impact on
individuals during only their very first month on Wikipedia.
Finally, in the case of an online community, such as Wikipedia, individuals might engage
in discussions on article talk pages or in ”editing wars”. This activity is directly caused by
the personal appeal and is beyond what the peer e↵ects in performance. Therefore, for the
direct peers of an individual the average amount of contributions excludes the page shared
with this individual.
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5 Results
This section discusses the main results of the analyses of peer e↵ects at the editor-article
and editor levels presented in Tables 2 and 3. The first stage regressions for all tables
containing IV estimations are in the Appendix (see Tables 5 and 6). All results in the
tables include year and month dummies and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in the
parentheses.
The instruments significantly a↵ect the endogenous regressor in the first stage estimation
and have large partial F statistics for testing the weakness of instruments (Kleibergen-Paap
or Wald rk statistics Kleibergen and Paap (2006)), varying from 18 to 68 for the editor-
article level and 60-355 for the editor level. The tables 2 and 3 represent specifications with
ordinary least squares (columns 1 and 4) and fixed e↵ects (column 2 and 5) estimations.
Columns 3 and 6 in each table represent specifications where peer e↵ects are estimated using
the instrumental variable approach. In each specification I examine peer e↵ects using one of
the peer activity indicators, the log of average amount of bytes contributed or the number
of peers. It turns out that both peer activity indicators should be considered as endogenous,
according to the ”endogeneity test”, also called Sargan-Hansen J-test.12
The analysis does not reveal a strongly significant impact of average peer contribution on
the individual per article contributions (Table 2). The performance of the instrument in the
first stage is rather poor and the endogeneity test rejects the null hypothesis only at 10 per
cent level. Therefore, I rely on the OLS and FE estimation results for this model. However,
the number of peers on the article yields a positive e↵ect of 0.17 per cent to an individual
contribution on the article. The results suggest that the personal interest in the article topic
matters for the amount of contributions as well as spillovers coming from the vast number of
editors who also edited the article. These editors are not peers, their number is exogenous
to the focal individual and might reflect the general level of attention to the article, which
is not captured by the number of clicks (readership).
12The corresponding  2 test statistics ranges from 3.35 to 15.2.
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Table 2: Peer e↵ects on editor-article level
Log length of contribution (in bytes)
OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS
Log Peer av. contrib. per article (bytes) 0.024 0.056 0.426⇤
(0.035) (0.039) (0.223)
# peers per page 0.085⇤⇤⇤ 0.082⇤⇤⇤ 0.169⇤⇤⇤
(0.019) (0.025) (0.046)
Interest in the category (%) 0.018⇤⇤⇤ 0.046⇤⇤⇤ 0.047⇤⇤⇤ 0.019⇤⇤⇤ 0.047⇤⇤⇤ 0.048⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.004) (0.011) (0.012)
Editor experience (months) -0.004 0.033 0.788 -0.004 -0.013 0.319
(0.003) (0.028) (0.584) (0.003) (0.023) (0.599)
Pages shared with peers (%) -0.017 -0.061⇤⇤ -0.076⇤⇤⇤ -0.016 -0.055⇤⇤ -0.052⇤⇤
(0.016) (0.028) (0.029) (0.016) (0.028) (0.025)
# editors per page 0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.019⇤⇤⇤ 0.018⇤⇤⇤ -0.006 0.003 -0.014
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
Page size (Kb) -0.003⇤⇤ -0.005 -0.006 -0.002⇤ -0.005 -0.005
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Peer interest in the category (%) -0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Peer experience (months) -0.002 -0.000 0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Peer pages shared with peers (%) 0.079⇤⇤ 0.002 0.040 0.076⇤⇤ -0.002 0.000
(0.034) (0.039) (0.047) (0.034) (0.039) (0.038)
Observations 1983 1983 1983 1983 1983 1983
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 18.04 68.60
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Notes: The table shows the results of the reduced form regressions to estimate peer e↵ects. Columns (1)-(3) show the results
for the peer average contribution and Columns (4-6) for the number of peers. Specification (1) and (4) show OLS results; (2)
and (5) show FE results. In Columns (3) and (6) I assume that peer e↵ects are endogenous and estimate them in two steps. All
regression coe cients are presented with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1. The unit of observations is the contribution of an editor on article on month t. All month and year dummies are
included.
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As compared to contributions per article, overall individual contributions to Wikipedia
seem to experience important peer e↵ects (see Table 3) both in terms of average peer con-
tributions and the number of peers. The results show that, while controlling for observable
editor and peer characteristics, an increase in the average peer contribution by 1 per cent
has a positive e↵ect of 0.44 per cent on individual contributions. Taking the median values
for peer and individual contributions across all articles from table ?? we can interpret the
peer impact as follows. An increase in peer contributions by 1 per cent would amount to
130 bytes and it would correspond to a 0.44 per cent increase in individual contributions,
or 8.8 bytes. Assuming that 1000 bytes are approximately a page of A4 size, an increase in
peer contributions by one text page would lead to an increase in individual contributions by
1/10th of the page.
Another measure of peer e↵ects, spillovers from an increase in the number of peers con-
tributing to the articles, yields a positive e↵ect on individual contributions of 0.05 per cent.
The IV estimates tend to be larger in magnitude than the OLS. This can be the case if
some unobserved group shocks act in the opposite direction to the endogenous e↵ects, which
yields lower estimates if groups shocks (or correlated e↵ects) are not ruled out by the IV
estimation. Overall, any pair of peers would share only a subset of all shocks to articles
so that it is di cult to unambiguously predict whether the OLS estimator should be larger
than the IV.
Apparently, peer performance indeed a↵ects individual performance and translates to
larger total contributions to Wikipedia. Individuals that have active peers seem to redis-
tribute their e↵ort to other articles that need further improvement rather than keeping to
improve the quality of the articles they contributed to before.
Other factors that matter for the length of contributions or the number of revisions
are the preferences and interests of individuals. The results reveal the importance of an
individual interest in a specific topic. Firstly, the interest in a specific topic is positively
associated with the size of contributions. A 1% increase in the interest in a concrete topic
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Table 3: Peer e↵ects on editor level
Log length of contribution (in bytes)
OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS
Log Peer av. contrib. per article (bytes) 0.039⇤⇤ 0.039⇤⇤ 0.442⇤⇤⇤
(0.018) (0.020) (0.112)
# peers on all pages 0.070⇤⇤⇤ 0.069⇤⇤⇤ 0.050⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011)
Interest in the category (%) 0.031⇤⇤⇤ 0.042⇤⇤⇤ 0.040⇤⇤⇤ 0.032⇤⇤⇤ 0.040⇤⇤⇤ 0.041⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008)
Editor experience (months) -0.012⇤⇤⇤ -0.020⇤ 0.190⇤⇤⇤ -0.012⇤⇤⇤ 0.004 0.123⇤
(0.002) (0.011) (0.070) (0.002) (0.014) (0.064)
Pages shared with peers (%) -0.018⇤ -0.031⇤ -0.045⇤⇤⇤ -0.007 -0.014 -0.018
(0.010) (0.016) (0.017) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014)
Peer interest in the category (%) -0.006 -0.007 -0.030⇤⇤⇤ -0.002 -0.004 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Peer experience (months) -0.004 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Peer pages shared with peers (%) 0.058⇤⇤ 0.032 0.145⇤⇤⇤ 0.057⇤⇤ 0.030 0.028
(0.026) (0.026) (0.042) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Observations 4418 4418 4417 4418 4418 4417
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 60.91 355.50
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Notes: The table shows the results of the reduced form regressions to estimate peer e↵ects. Columns (1)-(3) show the results
for the peer average contribution and Columns (4-6) for the number of peers. Specification (1) and (4) show OLS results; (2)
and (5) show FE results. In Columns (3) and (6) I assume that peer e↵ects are endogenous and estimate them in two steps. All
regression coe cients are presented with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1. The unit of observations is the contribution of an editor on Wikipedia on month t. All month and year dummies are
included.
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measured by the share of contributions to the category, leads to a 0.04% increase in the size
of a contribution per article or overall within a given period of time.
6 Robustness check
In order to demonstrate to which extent the results are robust to alternative specifications,
I perform a robustness check for the analysis at the editor level. To address the potential
endogeneity in network formation problem, I take the subsample of editors during their first
month after joining Wikipedia. They recently joined and, hence, had little time to learn
about potentially existing stable productive clusters of peers that already recognize each
other. I perform the same regression as in equation 2 using the two-stage least squares
approach with instrumental variables but now in the cross-section framework.
In the results (see Table 4) I consider the activity of exclusively unexperienced editors of
Wikipedia, i.e. those who contributed to Wikipedia during a month for the first time. The
measures of peer activity and amount should again be treated as endogenous, according to
the ”endogeneity test”.13 The preferred results obtained by 2SLS estimation suggest that the
e↵ects from the main results are robust to self-selection into network. The peer e↵ects are
still present and their magnitude is similar to the baseline model, of about 0.37 per cent for
the average amount of peers’ contributions (slightly lower than in the baseline model) and
0.32 per cent for the number of peers (higher than in the baseline model). This means that
if the learning or self-selection takes place to some extent, this would slightly bias upwards
the impact of average amount of peers’ contributions and downwards the impact of the
number of peers. However, the magnitudes of the main results still provide a quantitatively
trustworthy indication of the potential of peer e↵ects in Wikipedia.
13The corresponding  2 statistics ranges from 3.34 to 3.98.
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Table 4: Robustness check: Peer e↵ects on editor level only for unexperienced editors
Log length of contribution (in bytes)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Log Peer av. contrib. per article (bytes) 0.146⇤⇤⇤ 0.368⇤⇤⇤
(0.045) (0.132)
# peers on all pages 0.104⇤⇤⇤ 0.316⇤⇤⇤
(0.035) (0.122)
Interest in the category (%) 0.030⇤⇤⇤ 0.030⇤⇤⇤ 0.031⇤⇤⇤ 0.032⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Editor experience (months) 0.142 0.089 0.200 0.250
(0.173) (0.175) (0.171) (0.180)
Pages shared with peers (%) -0.034⇤⇤⇤ -0.035⇤⇤⇤ -0.031⇤⇤⇤ -0.026⇤⇤⇤
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
# editors per page -0.001 -0.001 -0.025⇤⇤⇤ -0.073⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.028)
Peer interest in the category (%) -0.003 -0.020 0.005 -0.000
(0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009)
Peer experience (months) 0.007 0.011 0.006 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Peer pages shared with peers (%) 0.048 0.128⇤⇤ -0.004 -0.006
(0.040) (0.061) (0.037) (0.037)
Observations 610 610 610 610
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 57.81 23.18
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Notes: The table shows the results of the reduced form regressions to estimate peer e↵ects. Columns (1)-(2) show the results
for the peer average contribution and Columns (3-4) for the number of peers. Specification (1) and (3) show OLS results; In
Columns (2) and (4) I estimate peer e↵ects in two steps using instrumental variables. All regression coe cients are presented
with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The unit of observations is
the contribution of an editor on Wikipedia on month t. All month and year dummies are included.
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7 Concluding remarks
The existence and the size of potential peer e↵ects in online communities has been ex-
amined by few studies in the context of social networks and open-source software projects.
Wikipedia is an online platform for peer knowledge generation that shares some similarities
as well as very distinct features with the other kinds of platforms. This study is (to the
best of my knowledge) the first to analyze the existence of peer e↵ects in content generation
due to contributor interactions on Wikipedia. Moreover, my study addresses the importance
of coordination on article talk pages for creating social ties between contributors and, as a
consequence, the emergence of multiplicative e↵ects in online content generation.
The results show that, while controlling for observable editor and peer characteristics, an
increase in the monthly average peer contribution by 1 per cent increases the amount of indi-
vidual monthly contributions to Wikipedia (among individuals that contribute to Wikipedia
every month) by about 0.44 per cent. Similarly, spillovers coming from the number of peers
yield a positive e↵ect of 0.17 per cent per article to 0.05 per cent per overall monthly con-
tributions to Wikipedia. This evidence suggests that even in the absence of explicit social
ties between individuals peer e↵ects are present. These e↵ects are both observed among
individuals that contribute monthly to Wikipedia. The other characteristic that matters for
the amount of individual contributions is an interest, or an expertise, in a special category of
articles. These results suggest that communications between most active community mem-
bers encourages building-up and promoting new online communities and enhances knowledge
generation in the existing online communities.
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8 Appendix
Table 5: First stage equations for log-peer contributions (bytes) on editor-article level
(1) (2)
Av. # indirect peers per page 0.365⇤⇤⇤
(0.044)
Av. # indirect peers on all pages 0.059⇤⇤⇤
(0.014)
Interest in the category (%) -0.002 -0.010
(0.011) (0.012)
Editor experience (months) -0.425 0.975
(0.594) (0.826)
Pages shared with peers (%) 0.042⇤⇤ -0.027
(0.017) (0.020)
# editors per page -0.009⇤⇤ 0.129⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.011)
Page size (Kb) 0.000 -0.006
(0.003) (0.004)
Peer interest in the category (%) 0.010⇤ -0.010⇤
(0.005) (0.006)
Peer experience (months) -0.012⇤⇤⇤ -0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Peer pages shared with peers (%) -0.065 0.058
(0.045) (0.035)
Observations 1983 1983
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 6: First stage equations for log-peer contributions (bytes) on the editor level
(1) (2)
Av. # indirect peers on all pages 0.113⇤⇤⇤ 0.433⇤⇤⇤
(0.013) (0.044)
Av. # indirect peers on all pages (sq.) -0.002⇤⇤⇤ 0.005⇤⇤⇤
(0.000) (0.002)
Interest in the category (%) 0.005 0.017
(0.008) (0.014)
Editor experience (months) -0.159⇤⇤⇤ 0.032
(0.061) (0.097)
Pages shared with peers (%) 0.044⇤⇤⇤ -0.150⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.029)
Peer interest in the category (%) 0.054⇤⇤⇤ -0.031⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.007)
Peer experience (months) -0.012⇤⇤⇤ 0.002
(0.003) (0.004)
Peer pages shared with peers (%) -0.235⇤⇤⇤ 0.200⇤⇤⇤
(0.025) (0.040)
Observations 4417 4417
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
35
Table 7: Robustness check: First stage equations for log-peer contributions (bytes) on editor
level only for unexperienced editors
(1) (2)
Av. # indirect peers on all pages 0.148⇤⇤⇤ 0.172⇤⇤⇤
(0.019) (0.036)
Interest in the category (%) 0.001 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
Editor experience (months) 0.163 -0.320
(0.148) (0.218)
Pages shared with peers (%) 0.001 -0.028⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.010)
# editors per page -0.032⇤⇤⇤ 0.189⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.014)
Peer interest in the category (%) 0.060⇤⇤⇤ 0.009
(0.006) (0.008)
Peer experience (months) -0.008 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
Peer pages shared with peers (%) -0.269⇤⇤⇤ 0.108⇤⇤
(0.042) (0.042)
Observations 610 610
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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